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Does Westminster need Holyrood’s consent to repeal the Human 
Rights Act 1998? 
 
Under the Sewel convention, does Westminster need Holyrood’s consent to repeal the Human 
Rights Act 1998? Although superficially technical-sounding, this constitutional question is 
shaping up to be one of the most controversial to face the Westminster parliament elected on 
the 7th of May. The Conservative Party’s 2015 manifesto was categorical: “the next 
Conservative Government will scrap the Human Rights Act, and introduce a British Bill of 
Rights.” “This,” the Tories argued, “will break the formal link between British courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights, and make our own Supreme Court the ultimate arbiter of 
human rights matters in the UK.” Strikingly absent from this statement of political intent was 
any reflection on the implications of devolution. Such elisions may work perfectly well in a 
political campaign. Having been re-elected, however, the new Lord Chancellor, Michael Gove, 
must now come down to brass tacks and establish how this ambition can be realised politically, 
within the law and the constitution. On the evidence that has emerged since May’s poll, the 
new Conservative majority approaches the devolved dimensions of its human rights plans 
curiously unprepared. 
The 2012 report of the coalition government’s incoherent Bill of Rights Commission, which 
consisted of a near balance of HRA retentionists and abolitionists, placed considerable 
emphasis on the importance and challenges of devolution for UK human rights reform. 
However, this insight has been largely missing from the UK government’s scrutiny of the issues 
since. The Conservative Party’s Protecting Human Rights in the UK (2014) paper mentions 
devolution only in passing, observing that Chris Grayling wished to “work with the devolved 
administrations and legislatures as necessary to make sure there is an effective new settlement 
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across the UK.” Beyond this vague aspiration towards cooperation, during his tenure the 
outgoing Lord Chancellor was silent on how the division of powers within the United Kingdom 
might help or hinder his aspiration to “axe Labour’s Human Rights Act.” More recent remarks 
by UK ministers suggest continuing uncertainty and confusion on the law, but also on the 
constitutional conventions which lubricate relations between Westminster and the devolved 
parliaments. These misconceptions are not limited to ministers of the Crown. In October 2014, 
the Scotsman published an article headlined “Scotland exempt from Tories’ Human Rights Act 
axe,” which quoted a Scotland Office spokesman, who claimed “human rights legislation is 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament because it was ‘built into the 1998 Scotland Act [and] 
cannot be removed [by Westminster].’” As this article demonstrates, this comment, and a 
number of other, more recent comments, show a fundamental misunderstanding of the true 
nature of the devolution settlement, the division of responsibility for human rights between 
Westminster and Holyrood, and the significance of the constitutional conventions which have 
evolved since 1998.  
The Scotland Act, the Human Rights Act and the Sewel convention: untangling the knots 
The legal situation is complex. Under the Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Acts, the 
legislative and executive competence of Holyrood, Cardiff Bay and Stormont are limited by 
the European Convention on Human Rights. In their actions and their legislation, Scottish, 
Welsh and Northern Irish ministers and parliamentarians must respect the Convention. If they 
do not, the courts are empowered to intervene and to reduce the offending decisions or laws in 
judicial review. Acts of the Scottish Parliament are also invalid, under the Scotland Act, if they 
“relate to reserved matters” listed in Schedule 5 or if they purport to modify enactments 
protected by Schedule 4. Similar restrictions can be found in the Welsh and Northern Irish 
devolution legislation. These are distinct from the provisions of the Human Rights Act, section 
6 of which extends the application of Convention rights far more widely, to every “public 
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authority” in the land save for the Houses of Parliament themselves. Under section 126(1) of 
the Scotland Act, the concept of “Convention rights” is given the same meaning as in section 
1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, a careful reading of the Scottish devolution statute 
suggests two important conclusions which have not been widely or well understood in the 
public debate on HRA repeal in the Scottish and wider UK media. Firstly, the Human Rights 
Act is not “written into” the Scotland Act in the way many commentators and politicians have 
suggested; and secondly, human rights are not a reserved matter under the Scotland Act.  
The only reference to human rights to be found in Schedule 5 of the Act, which lists powers 
reserved to Westminster, emphasises that “observing and implementing international 
obligations,” including “obligations under the Human Rights Convention,” are not reserved 
matters. The concept of human rights merit no second reference in the text, and they do not fall 
under the “constitutional” reservations found in the Schedule’s first paragraph. The ineluctable 
conclusion follows: human rights are not a matter reserved to Westminster. They fall within 
Holyrood’s legislative competence.  If, for example, the parliament came under pressure to 
subject Scottish public authorities to additional human rights strictures beyond the Convention 
rights, this would be perfectly in order. Reflecting this division of responsibilities, in 2006 
Holyrood exercised its legislative responsibility for human rights to pass the Scottish 
Commission on Human Rights Act, establishing the functions and responsibilities of 
Scotland’s national human rights institution. However, Holyrood’s powers in the field are not 
limitless. Paragraph 1(2)(f) of Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act, which lists statutes protected 
from modification or repeal by Holyrood, provides that the parliament cannot disapply or 
amend the Human Rights Act, which currently requires every Scottish public authority – every 
state school, local council, university, court, police officer, public hospital, prison – to uphold 
Convention rights.  
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The final piece in this complex constitutional jigsaw puzzle is the Sewel convention. Based on 
commitments made by Lord Sewel in the House of Lords during the passage of the devolution 
legislation in 1998, the convention addresses the tension between devolution of plenary 
legislative power to devolved legislatures on one hand, and Westminster’s continuing 
sovereignty on the other. As section 28(7) of the Scotland Act itself makes clear, devolution 
“does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland” 
– even concerning devolved matters. However, Sewel articulated the principle – and now, the 
constitutional convention – that Westminster will not legislate concerning devolved matters 
without first securing the assent of the devolved legislature.  
This procedure has been employed on a number of occasions since the Scottish Parliament first 
met on the 12th of May 1999. The Labour-Liberal Democrat administration invited the Blair 
government to introduce the Civil Partnership Act 2004, despite the fact that family law falls 
clearly within Holyrood’s responsibilities. In 2011, the parliament declined to give consent to 
devolved aspects of the Welfare Reform Bill, and the offending provisions were limited to 
England and Wales only. Section 2 of the new Scotland Bill seeks to “recognise” the Sewel 
convention in law, providing “that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament.” The 
concept of “devolved matters” has not been used before in the Scotland Acts since 1998, which 
have hitherto emphasised devolved legislative competence being limited by reserved matters. 
Nor has the concept been defined in the draft legislation, at the time of writing. More 
significantly, this rendering of the convention also fails to reflect the emerging understanding 
of the scope of the convention in constitutional practice. In the years since the establishment 
of the Scottish Parliament, the convention has been extended. It has been accepted that the 
Sewel convention applies not only where the proposed legislation relates to matters which are 
not reserved, but also where the provisions of Westminster Bill will alter the legislative 
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competence of the devolved parliament or the executive competence of Scottish ministers. This 
understanding is reflected in the Scottish Parliament’s Standing Orders, Chapter 9B of which 
envisages that the legislative consent motion procedures apply to any: 
“Bill under consideration in the UK Parliament which makes provision (“relevant 
provision”) applying to Scotland for any purpose within the legislative competence of 
the Parliament, or which alters that legislative competence or the executive competence 
of the Scottish Ministers.” 
Thus, for example, Holyrood was invited to give its assent before Westminster passed the 
Scotland Act 2012 which, amongst other things, extended the Scottish Parliament’s legislative 
competence over income tax, airgun regulation, and re-reserved Antarctica. This process is 
now being pursued with the Scotland Bill currently before the UK parliament. Reflecting the 
conventional expectations, MSPs can be expected to indicate their approval before the latest 
iteration of devolution is enacted.  
Is consent needed for repeal? The critical arguments 
Pulling together these disparate threads returns us to my opening question: under the Sewel 
convention, does Westminster need Holyrood’s consent to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998? 
Would the repeal involve Westminster in exercising powers devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament, or alter its legislative competence or the executive competence of Scottish 
ministers? On one interpretation, it clearly does. This view has been articulated in the House 
of Commons by the newly-elected MP for Edinburgh South West, and SNP justice 
spokesperson, Joanna Cherry QC. In a Westminster Hall debate on the 30th of June 2015, the 
former advocate pressed the UK government in the following terms, neatly summarising the 
argument that even repealing the Human Rights Act would require Holyrood’s consent: 
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"The SNP has been deeply concerned by recent statements from Ministers that suggest 
that they believe that the UK Government could repeal the Human Rights Act without 
reference to the Scottish Parliament. They argue that the Sewel convention would not 
be engaged because human rights are a reserved matter. That is wrong and legally 
illiterate. Human rights are not a reserved matter and are not listed as such in schedule 
5 to the Scotland Act 1998. Schedule 4 to the Scotland Act protects the Human Rights 
Act against modification by the Scottish Parliament, but human rights per se are not a 
reserved matter. It was part of Donald Dewar’s scheme that all matters would be 
devolved unless they were specifically reserved. Human rights are not specifically 
reserved.  
Moreover, human rights are written into the Scotland Act. The European convention on 
human rights is entrenched in the Act through section 29(2)(d), which provides that an 
Act of the Scottish Parliament that is incompatible with the ECHR is actually outwith 
the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament. Section 57(2) states: A member 
of the Scottish Executive has no power to make any subordinate legislation, or to do 
any other act, so far as the legislation or act is incompatible with” the ECHR. It is 
therefore incorrect to say that human rights are a reserved matter. They are devolved 
and I urge the Minister to think carefully about the statements made by his colleagues 
to the effect that the Sewel convention would not be engaged. 
The Prime Minister has repeatedly spoken of a “respect” agenda, and I stand here as 
one of 56 SNP Members elected at the general election. I urge the Government to 
consider their respect agenda, to return to the Scotland Act 1998 and to get their lawyers 
to look at it carefully. They will find that human rights are not a reserved matter and 
are devolved, and that the Human Rights Act should not be repealed or otherwise 
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interfered with by the British Parliament without first seeking the consent of the 
Scottish Parliament.” 
This approach seems perfectly logical. Holyrood cannot legislate with respect to reserved 
matters. Human rights are not reserved. The Sewel convention recognises that Westminster 
will not legislate on reserved matters without Holyrood’s consent. Repeal will have a 
significant impact on the powers of institutions and public bodies under devolved 
responsibility. Therefore, Westminster requires Holyrood’s consent to repeal the Human 
Rights Act 1998. The UK government’s counter-argument depends on a particular answer to 
the following question: for the purposes of the Sewel convention, should the statutes listed in 
Schedule 4 to be treated as reserved matters, alongside those listed in Schedule 5? Their 
counter-argument would run as follows. Human rights are not a reserved matter, but the Human 
Rights Act should be treated as such by dint of the protection from modification extended to it 
by Schedule 4. Accordingly, the Sewel convention does not apply. Westminster is free to repeal 
the Act without reference to Holyrood – without securing their consent or over their objections 
– because the matter is reserved.  
Comments at the dispatch box since the election suggest that this is the UK government’s 
current understanding of the distribution in political responsibility for human rights – though 
it remains far from clear that ministerial statements are supported by robust legal analysis. 
Resisting an SNP amendment to the Scotland Bill, which would have deleted the Human Rights 
Act from the enactments protected by Schedule 4, Deputy Leader of the House, Therese 
Coffey, told MPs that the repeal of the Human Rights Act was “not directly a matter for the 
Scottish Parliament,” claiming “that this is a reserved for the UK Parliament and not a devolved 
matter.” This analysis was later echoed in the Commons by the Secretary of State for Justice. 
On the 23rd of June, Aberdeen North MP, Kirsty Blackman, invited Michael Gove to “make a 
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commitment to not imposing the repeal on Scotland against the will of our people.” Gove 
responded: 
“I think it is important to stress that in this United Kingdom Parliament, human rights 
are a reserved matter, and parties that support reform of the Human Rights Act secured 
more than 50% of the votes at the last general election.” 
In an interview with BBC Radio Scotland in May, David Mundell MP, articulated a similar 
view that the devolution aspects of the policy are uncomplicated. The Secretary of State for 
Scotland said: “new legislation replaces existing legislation and therefore the new Act will 
apply in Scotland.” None of these remarks suggest the new UK government has taken a “careful 
look”, in Cherry’s phrase, at the devolved dimension of HRA repeal.  
This diagnosis is supported by a distinct line of arguments developed by Iain Jamieson for the 
UK Constitutional Law Association, that Sewel consent is necessary for Westminster to repeal 
the Human Rights Act. Jamieson – a retired UK and Scottish Government lawyer who headed 
a small team of lawyers who instructed the drafting of the Scotland Act 1998 – has made three 
key points distinct from the question of whether or not Schedule 4 statutes should be treated as 
reserved matters for the purpose of Sewel. Firstly, he points out that even if we treat the Human 
Rights Act’s inclusion in Schedule 4 as denoting that it should be treated as a reserved matter 
for the purposes of Sewel, deleting it from Schedule 4 would have the indirect consequence of 
increasing Holyrood’s legislative competence. Thereafter, Holyrood would, for example, be 
able to empower Scottish public authorities to ignore Convention rights which currently restrict 
their decision-making and practices. This alone, he suggests, should “trigger” Holyrood’s 
consent being sought for repeal.  
Jamieson also points out that the Human Rights Act operates in a number of respect as the 
Scotland Act’s “dictionary.” Its repeal would erase the Scotland Act’s definitions of both 
9 
 
“Convention rights” – which have “the same meaning as the Human Rights Act” under section 
126(1) of the Scotland Act – and of “devolution issues.” Would the courts step in to lend these 
now legislatively empty terms meaning after HRA repeal? Or would these provisions be left, 
“batting the air”? If the latter, Jamieson suggests, repeal could risk robbing section 29 of the 
Scotland Act of its substance, freeing the Scottish parliament and government to ignore the 
Convention rights currently enshrined in the Scotland Act.  More significantly, Jamieson also 
points out that HRA repeal would also extend the powers of the Secretary of State to intervene 
under section 35(1) of the Scotland Act to prevent Holyrood legislation from being submitted 
for royal assent if the Secretary “has reasonable grounds to believe would be incompatible with 
any international obligations or the interests of defence or national security.” Under section 
126(10) Scotland Act, “international obligations” are currently defined as “any international 
obligations of the United Kingdom other than obligations to observe and implement EU Law 
or the Convention rights.” He argues that the implicit deletion of the Convention provisions 
from the Scotland Act’s understanding of the scope of “international obligations” “would have 
the effect of restricting the competence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Ministers by 
subjecting them to an increased control by the UK government” – and therefore also triggering 
the convention.  
UK ministers have offered only limited argument to support their claims that  “in this United 
Kingdom Parliament, human rights are a reserved matter,” but none of their public comments 
have begun to tangle with these arguments about repeal indirectly tampering with Holyrood’s 
legislative and executive competence. Although the Scottish Government has indicated that it 
intends to “robustly oppose” the Conservative government’s repeal plans, ministers have not 
advanced any reasoned case along the lines articulated by Jamieson. What is clear, however, is 
that the case for Sewel consent being necessary has not just one prong, but many, and cannot 
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be saved – as Therese Coffey and Michael Gove seem to suggest – simply by arguing that 
Schedule 4 protected enactments fall outside of the convention’s scope.  
It is questionable, however, whether the interpretation and application of the convention would 
be a justiciable matter between the UK and Scottish parliaments. As Professor Mark Elliot has 
argued, even the Scotland Bill provisions seeking to enshrine Sewel in law will not “turn the 
political constraint” into a “legal constraint” enforceable by the courts. They recognise, but 
arguably leave “the convention as a convention.” It is worth pointing out, however, that neither 
party to the conflict – the Scottish or UK government – has a straightforward monopoly over 
the interpretation of this convention. We are in the debatable lands of constitutionality morality 
rather than strict law, and both pugilists retain considerable room for manoeuvre.  
If the Westminster majority decided to exercise the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament to 
override Holyrood’s objections – the repeal would be legally effective. But in parallel, the UK 
government has no control whatever over whether or when a legislative consent motion is 
tabled in the Scottish Parliament. Concerning more consensual Westminster Bills touching on 
devolved matters, the process is coordinated between Scottish and UK ministers. But in the 
scenario that is now unfolding, even if Gove’s Ministry of Justice believes HRA repeal is not 
covered by Sewel, the Sturgeon government could nevertheless present a consent motion on 
its own initiative, on its own interpretation of the convention, and invite MSPs to decline to 
give their consent. Legally, this might represent an ineffective act of protest. Politically, it is 
pungent and would leave the Cameron government facing no choice but to drop the policy, to 
exempt Scottish public authorities from the repeal agenda, or to override an explicit lack of 
consent in a policy area which is – arguably – substantively devolved. In the wake of the 
independence referendum, in the context of an ongoing and often passionate debate about 
Scotland’s constitutional future and its place within the United Kingdom – Lord Chancellor 
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Gove may soon find that to continue to ignore the devolved dimensions of this policy is to play 
with fire. 
Andrew Tickell 
Lecturer in Law, Glasgow Caledonian University 
 
